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Chapter pages in book: (p. 27 - 32)because prices were too high. About one-third of all consumers thought that
this was a good time to buy, before prices went higher or shortages developed.
Why should consumers wish to defer purchases of durable goods
because prices were "too high" if at the same time they expected
prices to rise further? The last sentence in the quotation suggests
an answer which is consistent with all the findings. Apparently
only a minority of consumers expected shortages to develop, and
it may therefore be inferred that only a minority expected rapidly
advancing prices. Although consumers were asked to express an
opinion about the probable trend of prices during 1951, they were
not questioned on the magnitude of the change they expected.
Even if people did not believe that price controls would stop the
inflation, they surely believed that the controls would slow the rate
of advance. But if this were the case, the penalty for postponed
buying would not be severe, and there was no urgent reason to buy
immediately—after all, goods were plentiful at current prices. Un-
der the circumstances, some retrenchment from the abnormal rates




Inthe most general terms, a 'mobilization program will promote
an expansion in production, prices, or both if it results in an in-
crease in spending on newly produced goods and services. How
might that result come about? It is convenient to classify the pos-
sibilities under three headings:
1. The direct effects of increased defense expenditures. These
include both government expenditures and the fraction of pri-
vate investment that is intimately tied to defense production.
2. Increased expenditures induced by income growth.
3. Increased expenditures induced by changes in expectations that
are independent of income growth.
A factor will be described as inflationary if it leads to an increase
in total spending. The question of the relative changes in produc-
27tion and prices attendant on increased expenditures will be con-
sidered at the appropriate time.
One certain result of a large-scale mobilization program will be
an increase in government expenditures. Total expenditures will
rise if the increase in government spending is not offset by a de-
crease elsewhere in the economic system. The direct inflationary
impact of increased government expenditures will therefore be
reduced if the added expenditures are financed entirely from added
tax receipts.18 Deficit-financed expenditures will be inflationary:
since tax receipts are not increased initially, there may be no initial
offsetting reduction in private spending, and, furthermore, the in-
creased income resulting from the government expenditures may
induce additional consumer expenditures and perhaps additional
investment expenditures.1° If the increased government expendi-
tures are more than offset by increased tax receipts—that is, if the
government surplus grows or the deficit is reduced—the direct re-
suit of the government fiscal operations will be less inflationary
than if added receipts equaled added expenditures, and may even
be deflationary.
It was not the growth of defense expenditures that was respon-
sible for the price inflation of the first nine months of the Korean
War, but the abrupt rise in private expenditures. The seasonally
adjusted volume of government expenditures in the third quarter
of 1950 remained at the second-quarter level (Chart 1), and the
18Someincrease in total expenditures may occur even if added government expendi-
tures are financed by added tax receipts (see Trygve Haavelmo, "Multiplier Effects
of a Balanced Budget," Econornetrica, October pp. 311—318; Gottfried Haberler,
"Multiplier Effects of a Balanced Budget, Some Monetary Implications of Mr. Haa-
velmo's Paper," Econometrica, April 1946, pp. 148-151; and Franz Gehrels, "Infla-
tionary Effects of a Balanced Budget under Full Employment," American Economic
Review, December 1949, pp. 1276-4278).However, the multiplier effect will be
smaller than if the added expenditures were deficit-financed. If unemployed resources
exist, the theoretical value of the multiplier with a balanced budget is unity (total
expenditures rise only by the amount of increased government expenditures), if it is
assumed that the function relating consumptio'n to disposable income remains un-
changed and that investment expenditures are not affected by the increase in govern-
ment expenditures.
10Thusthe multiplier will be greater than unity. These statements assume, of course,
that private investment is not reduced in reaction to the deficit financing, or at least
not reduced enough to offset the increase in government expenditures.
28government surplus increased sharply (Table 2).20
expenditures began to increase in the fourth quarter, and there
was a reduction in the surplus. These developments may have
exerted some upward pressure on prices.It is certainly true that
the entire fourth-quarter increase in gross national product was
accounted for by government expenditures and inventory invest-
ment (Charts 1 and 6). However, it should be noted that whole-
sale prices rose only slightly in October and November (Chart 4).
It was not until the second consumer buying spree got under way
in December that wholesale prices rose sharply once again; they
reached their peak in the first quarter of 1951.21 The increased
government expenditures of that quarter were much more than
offset by added receipts. The enlarged surplus reduced the rate of
growth of disposable personal income (Chart 10), but this favorable
development was offset by the renewed surge of consumer spending.
Thus it was not government spending but the forward buying
of businessmen and consumers that boomed production and prices
through the first quarter of 1951. The rate of increase of prices
was alarming, of course, especially in view of the fact that the in-
flation began long before defense production was well under way.
Furthermore, the economy was operating at a high level of em-
ployment from the outset of the expansion; only 5 per cent of the
civilian labor force was unemployed in the second quarter of 1950,
and the ratio had dropped to 3 per cent by the first quarter of 1951.
Under the circumstances, it seemed necessary to institute controls
at the earliest feasible date.
The initial step in limiting credit for housing construction
was taken July 19, 1950, when mortgage terms on government-
20Thequarterly figures show the combined effect of federal, state, and local fiscal
operations. Annual figures reveal the following breakdown (in billions of dollars):
1949 1950 1951 1952
Government deficit (+) or surplus (—) +3.05 —8.27 —7.07 +2.42
Federal +2.03 —9.58 —7.45 +2.36
State and local +1.02 +1.31 +0.39 +0.06
Source: Survey of Current Business, July 1953, Table 5.
21Thesharp advance in wholesale prices during December and January may have
resulted in part from an effort by sellers to raise prices before a price freeze could be
announced.
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Govern- Government or Surplus (—)
ment Govern-Deficit (+)Gross to GNP
Year and Expendi-mentorSurplus(—) National(per cent)
Quarter turesReceipts (2 —3)Product (45)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1949 I 14.3 16.9 —2.6 63.1 —4.1
II 15.6 12.7 +2.9 62.8 +4.6
III 14.7 14.1 +0.6 64.6 +0.9
IV 15.1 13.2 +1.9 67.7 +2.8
1950 I 16.6 17.6 —1.0 64.7 —1.5
II 15.3 15.7 —0.4 67.6 —0.6
III 13.8 18.2 —4.4 74.2 —5.9
IV 15.7 18.4 —2.7 80.3 —3.4
1951 I 16.8 25.8 —9.0 79.1 —11.4
H 19.6 20.3 —0.7 80.3 —0.9
III 20.9 20.5 +0.4 82.2 +0.5
IV 22.2 20.2 +2.0 88.3 +2.3
1952 I 22.0 26.7 —4.7 83.4 —5.6
II 24.0 21.5 +2.5 84.4
III 23.7 22.4 +1.3 85.4 +1.5
IV 24.7 21.5 +3.2 94.7 +3.4
Note: The annual totals of the quarterly figures in column 4 differ from the values in
footnote 20 because of the rounding of the quarterly components of columns 2 and 3.
Source: Survey of Current Business, July 1953. Government Expenditures is the sum
of Government Purchases of Goods and Services (Table 42) and Government Transfer
Payments, Net Interest Paid by Government, and Subsidies less Current Surplus of
Government Enterprises (Table 46).Government Receipts is the sum of Personal
Tax and Nontax Payments (Table 44), Corporate Profits Tax Liability (Table 40),
and Indirect Business Tax and Nontax Liability and Contributions for Social Insur-
ance (Table 46).
guaranteed loans were tightened. The restrictions were extended
to nongovernment-aided private credit in October. Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation loans for nondefense purposes were
sharply reduced. Consumer credit controls were established in
30September and strengthened in October. The Federal Reserve
authorities raised rediscount rates in August and discouraged the
sale of short-term government securities to the Federal Reserve
during the last half of the year.
Despite these credit restrictions, the loans of all commercial
banks increased $7.5 billion and the privately held money supply
$7.0 billion during the last half of 1950, and prices surged upward
once again during the second buying wave. Accordingly, the Fed-
eral Reserve raised margin requirements, in January 1951 and
raised reserve requirements of member banks in January and early
February. The restrictions on real estate credit were extended to
a number of categories of commercial construction in February.
Reduced Federal Reserve open-market purchases of government
securities limited the expansion of bank reserves following an
accord with the Treasury, announced in March.22 Administrative
allocation of materials restrained private fixed investment in non-
defense industries after mid-1951. These restrictions probably
slowed the growth of private investment during 1951, thus reduc-
ing the rate of growth of income and, indirectly, the rate of growth
of consumer expenditures.
Increased rates of taxation also restrained the growth of dispos-
able personal income in 1951. A huge surplus was accumulated on
government account, but primarily in the first quarter of the year
(Table 2). The surplus was greatly reduced in the second quarter,
and deficits were run in the third and fourth quarters.23 Thus gov-
22 "The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord with re-
spect to debt-management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their
common purpose to assure the successful financing of the Government's requirements
and, at the same time, to minimize monetization of the public debt" (Joint An-
nouncement by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of
Governors, and of the Federal Open Market Committee, of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, March 4, 1951, reprinted in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1951, p. 267).
23 The surplus' of the first quarter reflected a sharp increase in corporate and indi-
vidual income tax receipts, a normal seasonal development which was accentuated by
increased rates of taxation. During the first half of the year, about $3 billion of the
cash surplus was retained in the Treasury's cash balance, $1.6 billion was used to
retire bank-held debt, and another $2 billion was returned to the public through the
retirement of government securities held by nonbank investors(Federal Reserve
Bulletin, July 1951, pp. 740—741). The deficits of the last half of the year were met
by drawing down the cash balance accumulated in the first six months and by the
(Continued on page 32)
Siernment fiscal operations were inflationary after the first quarter
—but less inflationary than if higher rates of taxation had not been
imposed. In fact, the major contribution of the government to
economic stability in 1951 was to slow the rate of growth of income
and thus help provide the setting in which the rise of consumer
saving had such important anti-inflationary consequences
Ifconsumers can claim the major share of the credit for pro-
moting economic stability in 1951, they must in fairness admit
that they had considerable help from the government and from
businessmen, and they must also accept a large share of the respon-
sibility for the instability of late 1950 and early 1951. Had gov-
ernment fiscal operations been more inflationary during 1951, and
had private fixed investment been uncontrolled, consumers might
not have been able to resist the lure of increased consumption
made easy by rising income. Had consumers not bought heavily
during the inflationary phase, they would not have saved as much
later. Had businessmen not ordered and produced so heavily in
1950 and early 1951, the decline in inventory investment in the
second half of 1951 might not have occurred to moderate the
growth of income. The neat balance of inflationary and defla-
tionary forces in 1951 was in no small part the consequence of
developments growing out of the inflation of 1950.
BalancedExpansion during 1952
Thebalance between defense and civilian needs that was struck
in mid-1951 was maintained through 1952. The share of gross
national product (in current dollars) devoted to national security
expenditures was increased from 11.3 per cent in 1951 to 14.1 per
sale of new securities (Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1952, pp. 118—119). Hence
the impact of the surplus was somewhat reduced during the first part of the 'year by
the return of a portion of the surplus to nonbank holders of government securities
and, conversely, the impact of the deficit may have been softened in the last six months
as the Treasury drew down its cash balance, since the sale of additional securities
probably would have increased the private money supply.
24Consumerssaved larger percentages of their incomes in 1941 than. in 1951, but
disposable income was rising so rapidly in 1941 that consumer expenditures mounted
along with personal saving (see below, pp. 46—51).
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